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Using daily data from the stock markets of nine European transition economies, this paper tests for
stock market contagion during the 1998 Russian ﬁnancial crisis by utilizing both univariate and bivariate
correlation analysis. The results of the linear model indicate that there is no evidence of contagion, while
the bivariate analysis, based on the newly developed Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia (CPS) test, reveals the
presence of structural breaks between the Russian and Czech stock markets. Moreover, crisis–post-crisis
comparison analysis shows that contagion occurred after the Russian crisis. This paper proposes to label
such an eﬀect as a “reverse” contagion. The results of Monte Carlo experiments show that the linear
model performs poorly under the null hypothesis of interdependence and systematically under-rejects in
the case of small test sizes. In sum, at least for the examined parameter values, it appears that the CPS
test has less size distortion than the linear model.
1. Introduction
International crises of the 1990s in emerg-
ing markets (including, the 1994 Mexico peso
crisis, the 1997 East Asian crisis, the 1998
Russian ﬁnancial crisis and the 1999 Brazil-
ian real devaluation) and their eﬀects on both
developed and developing economies put con-
tagion issues on the agenda. These issues are
closely related with the current debate on re-
forming and strengthening the international
ﬁnancial system in order to reduce the risks
of crises and contagion. In particular, Dorn-
busch, Park, and Claessens (2000) clearly for-
mulate this problem as follows:
“As the exact causes of contagion
are not known, neither are pre-
cise policy interventions which can
most eﬀectively reduce it. Mini-
mizing the risks of ﬁnancial con-
tagion and better management of
its impact will require actions by
governments and the private sec-
tor in both emerging markets and
leading industrialized countries, as
well as from international ﬁnancial
institutions.”2
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2Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), p.3.
Although it is commonly accepted that the
Russian ﬁnancial crisis of August 1998 was
contagious, there is still a lack of empirical
evidence. Results of recent tests for conta-
gion of the Russian ﬁnancial crisis are mixed.
For instance, Gelos and Sahay (2001) con-
cluded that during the Russian ﬁnancial cri-
sis there was no evidence for a “structural
break” among stock markets in Russia, Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. They com-
puted cross-market correlations based on a
linear relationship between markets and ad-
justed them for market volatility, i.e. het-
eroscedasticity. Meanwhile, using ﬁrm-level
information, Forbes (2000) found evidence of
contagion after the Russian crisis. She con-
structed a new data set for over 10,000 com-
panies in 46 countries to test how individual
company’s stock market returns are aﬀected
during the East Asian and Russian crises.
In this context, the object of this paper is to
test whether or not the Russian ﬁnancial cri-
sis was contagious and if it was, to measure
the stock market contagion between Russia
and eight transition economies: the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. I address these
issues by using both univariate and bivariate
correlation analysis. In line with the litera-
ture, the paper deﬁnes contagion as a struc-
tural break in cross-market linkages after a
shock to one country. Previous studies based
on univariate correlation coeﬃcients found no
evidence of such structural breaks in the rela-
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tionship between stock markets in the Euro-
pean transition economies during the Russian
ﬁnancial crisis. The analysis is extended to
other countries of the region, and the results
indicate no evidence of contagion.3 However,
the bivariate analysis, based on the newly de-
veloped Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia (CPS) test,
reveals the presence of structural breaks be-
tween the Russian and Czech stock markets
during the crisis period. Notably, in almost all
countries, the correlation coeﬃcient between
stock market returns decreased during the cri-
sis period, making a case of falling correla-
tions.
In addition to the traditional tranquil–crisis
comparison, I conducted the crisis–post-crisis
comparison in both applied univariate and bi-
variate tests. Such a comparison will likely
shed light on the nature of the relationships
among the markets after the crisis and reveal
a “reverse” contagion. Crisis–post-crisis anal-
ysis results indicate that the null of interde-
pendence is rejected for the Czech Republic as
well as for Latvia in all common factor cases.
Moreover, when I used S&P Euro and S&P
500 as common factors, the number of coun-
tries where the null of interdependence is re-
jected increased to four: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Latvia and Poland.
The above mixed results encourage the use
of power and sample size analysis to reveal
which test has the correct size and better
power. I performed the Monte Carlo simula-
tion experiments to assess the size and power
of the linear model and the CPS tests of conta-
gion. According to the results, at least for the
parameter values that I examined, the CPS
test appears to have less size distortion than
the linear model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section
2 begins with discussion of the origins of the
Russian ﬁnancial crisis of August 1998, and
then continues with review of the theoretical
and empirical literature on contagion in the
context of crises in the transition economies.
Then, the ﬁrst part of Section 3 discusses uni-
variate correlation analysis (also known as the
linear model), which was extensively used in
previous studies. The second part describes
the Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia (hereafter CPS)
3The results reported in this paper have been gen-
erated using Ox (available free for research purposes)
and R codes (open source). Program ﬁles are available
upon request.
test of contagion. Section 4 presents and dis-
cusses the data related issues. Section 5 con-
tains the empirical results of the CPS test and
the linear model. It also provides post hoc
power analysis of the linear model and the
CPS test based on Monte Carlo simulations
methodology. Finally, Section 6 presents con-
clusions.
2. Literature Review
2.1. The 1998 Russian Financial Crisis
When discussing the origins of the Russian
crisis, most economists argue that Russia ex-
perienced mainly a debt crisis which was trig-
gered as a result of a soft ﬁscal policy followed
by the Government and a tight monetary pol-
icy by the Central Bank. Gurvich (2001) ar-
gued this point of view and concludes that, in
the absence of external shocks, the macroeco-
nomic policy and the economy were far from
a crisis and limited changes were required to
prevent the crisis.
Regarding the other possible causes of the
Russian ﬁnancial crisis, Cooper (1999) em-
phasized the impact of another crisis, namely,
the 1997 Asian crisis. He argues that post-
Asian crisis world prices for oil and other
raw materials (mainly, gas and precious met-
als) declined negatively impacting the Rus-
sian economy, which relays heavily on these
exports for its foreign reserves. The Russian
ﬁnancial crisis occurred as other regions of the
world, such as East Asia and Latin America,
are undergoing ﬁnancial crises and problems
Nanto (1999).
Most authors dated the beginning of the
Russian crisis in May 1998. For instance,
Cooper (1999) reported that
“since at least May 1998, Rus-
sia has been facing a rapid de-
cline in investor conﬁdence which
in turn has led to a deteriora-
tion in general economic condi-
tions. The crisis came to a head
on August 17, 1998, when the gov-
ernment of then-Premier Sergei
Kiriyenko abandoned its defense
of a strong ruble exchange rate
against the dollar, defaulted on
government domestic debt forc-
ing its restructuring, and placed a
90-day moratorium on commercialWas the Russian Financial Crisis Contagious? 3
external debt payments.”
Regarding the possible contagion channels
during the crises in transitional economies
(the Thai, Russian, and Brazilian crises)
Hern` andez and Vald´ es (2001) presented evi-
dence on the relative importance of ﬁnancial
competition in the case of the Russian cri-
sis. Unlike to other considered crisis episodes,
they ﬁnd that trade links and neighboring-
country eﬀects are not relevant contagion
channels during the 1998 Russian ﬁnancial cri-
sis.4
There is little agreement about the deﬁni-
tion of contagion. Therefore, next section dis-
cusses issues related to the deﬁnition of con-
tagion. In particular, it provides diﬀerent def-
initions of contagion and extracts the partic-
ular deﬁnition that will be used in this paper.
For the purpose of this paper, the second part
will focus only on reviewing previous empiri-
cal work.5
2.2. Deﬁnition of Contagion and Empir-
ical Evidence
As noted in most surveys of the literature
on contagion, diﬀerent approaches have been
used to test for contagion and, subsequently,
diﬀerent deﬁnitions have been utilized. Some
researchers deﬁne contagion as a transmission
of a shock from one country to another, with
no signiﬁcant change in cross-market link-
ages. Others argue that deﬁning contagion
as changes in cross-market linkages is not ac-
curate, and therefore, simple tests for such
changes do not provide suﬃcient proof of con-
tagion. Instead, they recommend considering
only certain types of propagation and trans-
mission mechanisms of shocks across coun-
tries.
The most straightforward and, perhaps,
popular approach is a family of tests based on
cross-market correlation coeﬃcients.6 These
tests estimate correlation coeﬃcients of
changes in asset prices (stock prices, inter-
4According to Hern` andez and Vald´ es (2001)
neighboring-country eﬀect could capture ﬁnancial
links that are due to institutional arrangements in in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets.
5Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000) and
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) provided a comprehensive
review of both the theoretical and empirical literature
on contagion.
6See, among others, King and Wadhwani (1990);
Calvo and Reinhart (1995); Forbes and Rigobon
(2000); Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002).
est rates etc.) between two markets during
stable and crisis periods. A signiﬁcant in-
crease in correlation coeﬃcients is considered
to be evidence of contagion. In this point, it
is worthy to note that Forbes and Rigobon
(1999) proposed utilizing the phrase “shift-
contagion” (a shift in cross-market linkages)
instead of simply contagion. They argue that
the term “shift-contagion” clariﬁes that con-
tagion arises from a shift in cross-market link-
ages.
Besides the correlation coeﬃcients ap-
proach, there is a family of so called condi-
tional probabilities tests (probability of a cri-
sis conditional on information of the occur-
rence of a crisis elsewhere), which directly
measures changes in the propagation mech-
anism of shocks.7 Eichengreen, Rose, and
Wyplosz (1996) used this approach to esti-
mate a probit model and deﬁne contagion as
a case where the probability of a crisis in a
country at a point in time is correlated with
the incidence of crises in other countries at the
same time.8
The main advantage of the two above-
mentioned approaches is that they allow the
use of existing econometric models. At the
same time, as Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens
(2000) emphasized, the estimation of condi-
tional probabilities allows not only for the
testing of contagion but also for the investi-
gation of channels through which contagion
may occur.
The World Bank proposed classifying the
deﬁnitions of contagion as (a) broad, (b) re-
strictive and (c) very restrictive.9 The broad
deﬁnition sees contagion as the cross-country
transmission of shocks or the general cross-
country spillover eﬀects. The restrictive deﬁ-
nition describes contagion as the transmission
of shocks to other countries, beyond any fun-
damental link among the countries and be-
yond common shocks. Most of the empiri-
cal literature use very restrictive deﬁnitions of
contagion, which deﬁne contagion as a struc-
tural break in cross-market linkages. The cur-
rent paper will also utilize this restrictive def-
7For example, Baig and Goldfajn (1995) studied
the impact of daily news; Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco
(1996) examined the likelihood of crisis.
8Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000); Sachs, Tornell,
and Velasco (1996) also used probit models.
9Source: World Bank; http://www1.worldbank.
org/economicpolicy/resources.html; Date of access:
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inition of contagion. Because it allows the
using of simple tests of contagion, which ex-
amine changes in cross-market linkages before
and after a shock.
Tests based on the linear cross-market re-
lationships are frequently used in the existing
empirical literature. The ﬁrst paper, to use
this approach by King and Wadhwani (1990),
tests for an increase in cross-market correla-
tions between three major stock markets (the
US, UK and Japan) after the 1987 US stock
market crash. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase
in cross-market correlations after the market
crash and, therefore conclude that contagion
occurred.
However, later a number of papers disputed
this conclusion and explained it as a continu-
ation of strong cross-market linkages between
these markets.10 In other words, there was
no contagion, only interdependence. Ronn
(1998) showed that there is a bias in the esti-
mation of intra-market correlations in stocks
and bonds. However, he did not apply this is-
sue to contagion issues. Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) extended this analysis and applied it
to the measurement of cross-market correla-
tions.11 They proved that tests based on a lin-
ear relationships are biased because the cross-
market correlation coeﬃcient is conditional on
market volatility. It implies that the linear
model ignores the country-speciﬁc component
of the change in the variance of returns in
the country of origin of an international crisis.
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) made this bias ad-
justment and concluded that there was “vir-
tually no evidence of contagion” during the
1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1994 Mex-
ican peso collapse, and the 1997 Asian crisis.
An analytical review of this method is pro-
vided in Section 3.
Diﬀerent from previous tests based on
cross-market correlation coeﬃcients, Corsetti,
Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002) proposed a sin-
gle factor model with period-speciﬁc variance
of asset returns. Unlike the linear model,
the CPS test distinguishes between common
and country-speciﬁc components of market re-
turns. They showed that failing to diﬀerenti-
ate the above-mentioned two components in-
duces a bias towards the null hypothesis of
interdependence (no contagion). Another im-
10Ronn (1998); Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Boyer,
Gibson, and Loretan (1999).
11See also Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999).
portant feature of the CPS test is that it
does not impose restrictions on the variance
of common factors relative to the variance of
country-speciﬁc risks Corsetti, Pericoli, and
Sbracia (2002). The present paper also uses
this factor model and will, therefore, discuss
this method in detail Section 3.
3. Methodology
3.1. A Linear Model
As mentioned in Section 2, univariate cor-
relation analysis, i.e. the linear model, has
been frequently used to test for contagion of
the crisis under investigation. This analysis
will be discussed brieﬂy in this section. Fol-
lowing Forbes and Rigobon (2002), suppose
that stock market returns in two countries are
linearly related:
ri = ¯0 + ¯1 ¢ rj + ui (1)
where ri, rj are stock market returns in coun-
tries i and j, respectively; E[ui] = 0; E[u2
i] =
c < 1; E[rjui] = 0. From (1) the correlation




1 ¢ V ar(rj)
¯2
1 ¢ V ar(rj) + V ar(ui)
: (2)
It is obvious from this expression that the
correlation coeﬃcient ½ must increase during
a crisis period (i.e. a high variance period) as
V ar(rj) increases, even if the cross-country
linkage ¯1 does not change. Thus, to estimate
the unconditional correlation we need to ad-
just the increase in variance. We will calculate
the unconditional correlation based on the fol-









V ar(rj) ¡ 1 (the same as in
equation (9)). Then, we will test whether the
adjusted correlation (½adj) increased signiﬁ-
cantly during the crisis period. Thus, the null
hypothesis of interest is, H0: no signiﬁcant
increase in correlation. An evidence against
12This formula is derived under the assumptions
that Corr(rj;uC
i ) = Corr(rj;ui); V ar(uC
i ) =
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the null hypothesis will be interpreted as con-
tagion. The Fisher z-transformation will be
adopted to test for the equality between sta-
ble and crisis period (adjusted) correlation co-
eﬃcients.
3.2. Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia Test
The present paper uses a single factor
model with period-speciﬁc variance of asset
returns to test structural breaks in the in-
ternational transmission mechanism after the
Russian ﬁnancial crisis of August 1998. The
model has been proposed and applied to the
Hong Kong stock market crash by Corsetti,
Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002).
The Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia (CPS) test
consists of two components. The ﬁrst com-
ponent is data-generating processes (DGPs)
of stock market returns in countries i and j.
The second component is the speciﬁcation of
changes in the variance of common factor and
idiosyncratic country-speciﬁc factors between
stable and crisis periods. DGPs are based on
the following standard single factor model:
ri = ®i + °i ¢ f + "i
rj = ®j + °j ¢ f + "j (4)
where j is the country of origin of an inter-
national ﬁnancial crisis (in our case Russia);
° denote country-speciﬁc factor loadings; f
is a common factor; " represent idiosyncratic
country-speciﬁc factors; f, "i and "j are mu-
tually independent variables with ﬁnite vari-
ance.
A crisis in country j is deﬁned as an in-
crease in the variance of the rates of returns.
Mutual independency of f, "i and "j ensures
that the change in the variance of rj during
a crisis period will only depend on the com-
mon factor and the cross-market linkages be-
tween countries i and j. From the equation
(4) the correlation coeﬃcients between ri and
rj during the stable (½) and crisis (½C) peri-
ods can be expressed in terms of °, Var(f) and
Var(") in the stable and crisis periods, respec-
tively.13 Interdependence between markets is
deﬁned as a change in the correlation that is
consistent with the process in (4). Accord-
ingly, contagion takes place when, conditional
on a crisis in country j, ½C is stronger relative
to what is implied by the process in (4) and
13Note that Var("ijC) = Var("i), where C denoted
as the event crisis in country j.
it is too strong to be explained by the behav-
ior of f and ". Correlation during the crisis
period is stronger “because of some structural
change in the international economy aﬀecting
the links across countries” (Corsetti, Pericoli,
and Sbracia 2002).
The second step in the analysis is the spec-
iﬁcation of a measure of interdependence be-
tween countries i and j. In fact, it is a corre-
lation coeﬃcient between ri and rj under the
assumption that °i, °j, Var(") and Cov("i;"j)
do not change with the crisis in country j. Ac-
cordingly, it adjusts the correlation coeﬃcient
for the eﬀect on cross-border comovements of
a change in the volatility of stock prices in the
country where the international crisis origi-





1 + ½2[(1 + ±)Λ ¡ 1](1 + ¸j)
(5)
where ¸s are variance ratios; ½ and ½C are
correlation coeﬃcients during stable and cri-
sis periods, respectively; ± is the proportional
change in the variance of the stock market re-
turn rj relative to pre-crisis period and Λ =
(1+¸j=(1+¸C
j ). Variance ratios and the pro-
portional change in the variance of the stock
















Diﬀerent from previous tests based on
cross-market correlations where ½ is compared
with ½C, conditional CPS test hypotheses are
formulated as follows:
H0 : ½C · Á (interdependence)
H1 : ½C > Á (contagion) (7)
The intuition behind these hypotheses is
simple. If country-speciﬁc loadings, the vari-
ance of "i and Cov("i;"j) do not change dur-
ing the crisis period, then ½C = Á. If there is
an increase in the magnitude of factor load-
ings and/or a positive correlation between ",
then ½C > Á. It implies that contagion oc-
curred. A test of equality between Á and ½C6 U. Olimov
will be conducted on the basis of the Fisher
z-transformation framework.
3.3. Post-Crisis Analysis Framework
In addition to the traditional tranquil–crisis
comparison, a crisis–post-crisis comparison,
using both applied univariate and bivariate
techniques, will help us to understand the na-
ture of the relationships among markets after
the crisis.
There are several beneﬁts from doing such
analysis. One, comparison of just stable and
crisis periods does not allow for detailed in-
vestigation of the existing relationship among
markets. Beyond this, there are two problems
with such an investigation; ﬁrst crises are usu-
ally short and therefore provide only a small
sample, and second, it is diﬃcult to determine
the exact ending of a crisis. To reveal such
eﬀects we can compare crisis and post-crisis
period cross-market correlations.
This section adopts both the linear and the
CPS tests for ’post-crisis’ analysis. In both
tests we will take the crisis period as such, and
then, the post-crisis period as the “tranquil”
period. The measure of interdependence, ÁP,




1 + (½P)2[(1 + ±P)ΛP ¡ 1](1 + ¸P
j )
(8)
which is similar to the equation 5. We simply
substituted ½ with ½P in the formula (5). In
this case, variance ratios and the proportional
change in the variance of the stock market re-



















In the case of the linear model, the null
hypothesis of interest is H0 : ½C · ½P (in-
terdependence), where ½P is post-crisis cross-
country correlation coeﬃcient. Similarly, for
the CPS test the null will be as H0 : ½C · ÁP.
In both cases an evidence against the null hy-
pothesis will be considered as a contagion ef-
fect.
3.4. The Fisher z-transformation





1 + ˆ ½
1 ¡ ˆ ½
)
where ˆ ½ is the estimated correlation. Under
the assumption that two samples are drawn
from two independent bivariate normal dis-
tributions with the same correlation coeﬃ-
cient, the diﬀerence between estimated z(ˆ ½)
in the two samples converges to a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance of
[1=(n1 ¡ 3) + 1=(n2 ¡ 3)]. In the case of the
CPS test z-statistic is
z ¡ stat =












where ˆ Á and ˆ ½C are the estimated Á and
½C; n and nC are the size of the two samples
during stable and crisis periods, respectively.
However, as noted in Corsetti, Pericoli, and
Sbracia (2002), the assumption of indepen-
dent samples is violated, and therefore, the
signiﬁcance level of the z-statistic is not stan-
dard. Based on Monte Carlo simulation ex-
periments, they reported the signiﬁcance level
of the Fisher’s z-statistic for the CPS test is
between 7 and 9 per cent. I will use the same
signiﬁcance interval for the CPS test.
4. Data
The data used in this paper consists of
daily data for stock price changes in nine Eu-
ropean transition economies, namely, Hun-
gary (market index – BUX); Slovenia (SBI20);
the Czech Republic (PX50); Poland (WIG20);
Latvia (RICI); Estonia (TALSE); Slovakia
(SAX); Ukraine (PFTS); and Russia (RTS).
Historical records for RTS, RICI, PX50,
TALSE, PFTS and SBI20 indices have been
downloaded from their oﬃcial websites.14 I
14Ljubljana Stock Exchange (http://www.ljse.
si); Prague Stock Exchange (http://www.pse.cz);
Russian Trading System (http://www.rts.ru); Riga
Stock Exchange (http://www.rfb.lv); Tallinn Stock
Exchange (http://www.tse.ee); PFTS Stock Trading
System (http://www.pfts.com). Date of access: April
2002.Was the Russian Financial Crisis Contagious? 7
Table 1
Summary Statistics.
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis JB test Q Q2 T
Czech R. -0.01 1.62 0.13 5.93 151.9* 22.29 91.18* 422
Estonia -0.19 2.91 -0.76 11.21 1225* 26.55 47.47* 422
Hungary 0.03 2.83 -0.23 9.87 833.7* 33.86** 79.44* 422
Latvia -0.36 1.81 -0.52 5.22 105.4* 6196* 74.54* 422
Poland 0.05 2.76 0.63 10.44 1002* 21.60 19.55 422
Russia -0.23 4.37 -0.25 4.96 71.69* 30.45 42.75* 422
Slovakia -0.2 1.93 -0.35 11.51 1283* 6.52 44.01* 422
Slovenia 0.06 0.99 0.29 11.65 1323* 56.93* 21.48 422
Ukraine -0.16 3.91 -1.11 23.93 7786* 39.26* 77.35* 422
Note: JB test – Jarque-Bera normality test (distributed as Â2
2). Q and Q2 – Ljung-Box test for returns
and squared returns with 20 lags, respectively (distributed as Â2
20). *Signiﬁcant at the *1% (**5%) level.
obtained the data for BUX, SAX and WIG20
indices directly from their respective stock ex-
changes.15
There are several reasons for selecting these
countries. First, all of these transition
economies were centrally planned economies
in the past. Next, given the time restric-
tions on this research I was not able to col-
lect the stock market data from other transi-
tion economies of the region.16 Last, some of
them did not have daily data, or even a stock
market index during the considered period.
Most of the Eastern European countries
began their transitions into free market
economies in the late 1980s (the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slo-
vakia are among others), while republics of the
former Soviet Union (in our example Estonia,
Latvia, Ukraine and Russia) started their eco-
nomic reforms in the early 1990s. Hence, like
other market institutions stock markets also
began functioning in diﬀerent countries in dif-
ferent years. Consequently, the sample size of
the original data series ranges between 1,000
and 2,500 covering the period 1993-2002. Af-
ter removing all holidays and weekends, there
are 422 observations remaining, which cover
the period of January 12, 1998 – December
20, 1999.
Table 1 reports summary statistics, includ-
ing the mean, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis coeﬃcients for daily returns. The
15Budapest Stock Exchange (info@fornax.hu);
Warsaw Stock Exchange (gielda@wse.com.pl); and
Bratislava Stock Exchange (webmaster@bsse.sk).
Date: May 2002
16The daily stock market data is not available (at
least on their web sites).
returns are deﬁned as logarithmic diﬀerences
of stock market indices multiplied by 100. In
addition, the table includes the Jarque-Bera
normality test and the Ljung-Box serial cor-
relation test statistics for both returns (Q)
and squared returns (Q2) with 20 lags. The
Jarque-Bera normality test and high kurtosis
coeﬃcients show the non-normality of all of
these time series. Ljung-Box statistics for re-
turns indicates signiﬁcant autocorrelation for
all countries, except Hungary, Latvia, Slove-
nia and Ukraine. At the same time, the
Ljung-Box statistics for the squared returns
is signiﬁcant almost for all countries (except
Poland and Slovenia) and suggests an ARCH
process for the conditional variance.
Figures 1 and 2 graph stock market in-
dices for Russia, Estonia and Ukraine17 In-
dices are based on two-day rolling average re-
turns. They indicate that during the Russian
ﬁnancial crisis, the stock markets have tended
to move together. It should be noted the sim-
ilar tendency has been observed in other con-
cerned countries.
5. Empirical Findings
5.1. Correlation Analysis Results
Before any empirical implementation of the
CPS can be done test the following two impor-
tant problems should be addressed: (1) iden-
tiﬁcation of the crisis period; (2) estimation
of the theoretical measure of interdependence.
Tests based on cross-market correlation anal-
ysis require measuring the correlation in re-
17Estonia and Ukraine have been selected for illus-
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(b) Two day rolling averages.
Figure 1. Russia, RTS Index: January 12,
1998 – December 20,1999. Note: Standard
deviation of two-day rolling averages of daily
stock market returns (the moving window is
equal to 3 months).
turns between markets during stable and crisis
periods. Therefore, the crisis and non-crisis
periods need to be identiﬁed. When observ-
ing the stock market volatility behavior, Gelos
and Sahay (2001) used the window of July 15,
1998 – October 15, 1998 as the turbulent pe-
riod for the Russian crisis. In Figures 1 and
2 this period is labeled by solid vertical lines.
However, as discussed in Section 2, most au-
thors dated the beginning of the Russian crisis
in May 1998. Figure 1 has two peaks, one be-
longs to May 1998, and the other to August
1998. A dotted vertical line represents May

















21Jan98 1May98 9Aug98 25Feb99 5Jun99 13Sep99
(b) Estonia, TALSE.
Figure 2. Two day rolling averages. January
12, 1998 – December 20,1999.
observed with all countries, except Slovenia.
Therefore, May 12 – October 15, 1998 can
be considered as another possible crisis win-
dow (between the dotted and the second solid
lines). Taking into consideration this point, I
checked for the robustness of both crisis peri-
ods.
The second important issue is related to the
estimation of the measure of interdependence
(Á). From equation (5) the estimation of Á
requires calculation of variance ratios, corre-
lation coeﬃcients during stable and crisis pe-
riods and, ﬁnally, the proportional change in
the variance of the stock market return in the
country of origin of the ﬁnancial crisis relative
to the pre-crisis period. After deﬁning stable
and crisis periods, it is logical to calculate theWas the Russian Financial Crisis Contagious? 9
required correlation coeﬃcients and the pro-
portional change in the variance of the stock
market return from the data. However, since
the variance ratios depend on a common fac-
tor and the common factor is not observable,
it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd good estimates of the vari-
ance ratios.
Following Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia
(2002) a composite common factor is approx-
imated by the average daily return in a cross
section of stock markets (IRTS – including
Russia, ERTS – excluding Russia). As al-
ternative proxies I also use two Standard &
Poors indices, S&P Euro Index and S&P 500
Index.18 Moreover, two other estimates of the
unobserved common factor, FINC (including
Russia) and FEXL (excluding Russia) are ob-
tained using a factor analysis package of R-
system for statistical computation and graph-
ics (Ihaka and Gentleman 1996). The Thom-
son’s scores have been used in the estima-
tion. Using the above-mentioned common fac-
tor proxies and the residuals from univariate
regressions (4), we estimated the variance ra-
tios for each common factor.
The results are presented in Table 2. The
ﬁrst part of the table reports estimated vari-
ance ratios for tranquil–crisis period analy-
sis, while the second part does for crisis–post-
crisis period analysis. 19 According to equa-
tion (6) a larger variance ratio (¸j) implies a
smaller relevance of the common factor (f).
From Table 2 it is clear that IRTS, ERTS,
FINC and FEXL are more relevant common
factors than S&P Euro and S&P 500. In other
words, in the case of S&P Euro and S&P 500 a
larger fraction of the overall change in volatil-
ity in Russia can be attributed to country-
speciﬁc noise.
Before moving to the correlation analysis
results, it is useful to look at raw cross-market
correlations during tranquil, crisis and post-
crisis periods. Table 3 provides daily stock
return correlations before, during and after
the Russian ﬁnancial crisis. Case 1 and Case
2 correspond to possible crisis windows dis-
cussed above. Here it is worth mentioning two
interesting points: one, in most countries (5 of
18S&P Euro Index includes 12 Euro zone countries.
S&P 500 Index consists of 500 stocks chosen for mar-
ket size, liquidity, and industry group representation
19Note that the post-crisis period is deﬁned as Octo-
ber 16, 1998 – December 20, 1999 and covers a period
of about 14 months after the Russian ﬁnancial crisis.
8 in Case 1 and 4 of 8 in Case 2) the correla-
tion coeﬃcient between stock market returns
decreased during the crisis period, making a
case of falling correlations. Two, in general,
in Case 1, in all countries except Slovakia the
correlation coeﬃcients continued declining af-
ter the Russian crisis. In some cases it came
close to zero (the Czech Republic), in other
cases became even negative (Latvia). Table
3 also reports the p-values of the Fisher test
for equality of correlations. Comparison of
the tranquil and crisis period daily stock re-
turn correlations shows that there was a sig-
niﬁcant increase in correlations only between
the Czech and Russian stock markets. At the
same time, however, comparing correlations
during the crisis and post-crisis period indi-
cates meaningful diﬀerences in correlation co-
eﬃcients between the Russian and the Czech,
Hungarian, Latvian and Polish stock markets.
Furthermore, I draw a scatter diagram (see
Figure 3) with crisis correlation on the hori-
zontal and tranquil and post-crisis correlation
on the vertical, with the same axis range on
both axes. Figure 3 clearly illustrates that
circles, which represent tranquil period cross-
market correlation coeﬃcients, are mainly lo-
cated above (in Case 1) and around (in Case
2) the 45-degree line.20 It indicates that tran-
quil period correlation coeﬃcients are higher
than or equal to crisis period ones. In con-
trast, triangles, which represent post-crisis pe-
riod correlations, are scattered below the 45-
degree line and close to the horizontal axis.
The results of the linear model (1) are pre-
sented in Table 4. They include estimated
correlation coeﬃcients during tranquil, crisis
and post-crisis periods as well as the Fisher z-
statistic. As discussed in Section 3 the cross-
market correlation coeﬃcient is conditional on
market volatility in the country of origin of
the international crisis. Therefore, to estimate
the unconditional correlation (½adj), we ad-
justed conditional correlations (½) using equa-
tion (3). The results of the Fisher test for the
null hypothesis ½adj · ½ indicate an absence of
structural breaks during the Russian ﬁnancial
crisis. However, crisis–post-crisis analysis re-
sults indicate that the null of interdependence
is rejected again for the Czech Republic as
well as Latvia for all common factor cases.
20If correlations are equal then circles (triangles)
should fall on the 45-degree line.10 U. Olimov
Table 2
Variance Ratios.





S&P Euro 13.01 6.16 3.32 2.39
S&P 500 10.30 6.87 10.70 13.88
IRTS 0.52 0.66 1.92 0.79
ERTS 1.57 1.68 4.73 2.65
FINC 1.01 0.79 3.19 1.56
FEXL 1.53 1.09 3.96 2.23
Notes: ¸j, ¸C
j , and ¸P
j are estimated variance ratios (equations 6 and 9); Pre-crisis period: 01/12/98 – 07/14/98,
T = 112; Crisis period: 07/15/98 – 10/15/98, T = 63; Post-crisis period: 10/16/98 – 12/20/99, T = 246. IRTS
and ERTS – average daily return in a cross section of stock markets (including and excluding Russia,
respectively); FINC and FEXL – common factors from maximum-likelihood factor analysis.
Moreover, when we used S&P Euro and S&P
500 as common factors, the number of coun-
tries which are the null of interdependence is
rejected increased up to four (the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Latvia and Poland).
Table 6 contains the CPS test results, in-
cluding the estimations of the measure of in-
terdependence and the Fisher z-statistic for
each of the above-mentioned common factors
as well as for tranquil–crisis and crisis–post-
crisis analysis. In Table 6 periods of January
12 – July 14, 1998, July 15, 1998 – October
15, 1998 and October 16, 1998 – December
20, 1999 are considered as tranquil, crisis and
post-crisis period, respectively. The CPS test
results provide strong evidence of contagion
from Russia to the Czech Republic in the case
of both all common factors. At the same time,
post-crisis analysis revealed that there were
structural breaks in the relation of the Rus-
sian with the Czech and Latvian stock returns
in the case of all common factors, and with the
Hungarian and Polish in the case of S&P 500.
Analysis reveals that the results are associ-
ated with falling correlations during the cri-
sis period (Table 3). 21 In contrast, if we
also deﬁne contagion as weaker-than-normal
ties (i.e. falling correlations) there are a num-
ber of cases in our example which could be
considered as a contagion.22 One possible ex-
21Recall that the test is conditional on an observa-
tion of a signiﬁcant rise in cross-market correlation.
22For example, in the case of Estonia, Hungary,
planation for falling correlations is given by
Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002) (p.7).
During a market turmoil, shocks to the com-
mon factor tend to cause large co-movements
of stock prices. At the same time, the coun-
try of origin of the international crisis may
also be subject to large shocks that remain
country-speciﬁc. As a result, we may expect
a decrease in cross-market correlations. Nev-
ertheless, following our deﬁnition of contagion
(stronger-than-normal ties), the CPS test re-
vealed evidence of contagion after the Russian
ﬁnancial crisis of August 1998.
Table 5 reports a number of robustness-test
results. Accordingly, using diﬀerent deﬁni-
tions of tranquil, crisis and post-crisis peri-
ods, replacing rolling averages of returns (our
benchmark) with simple daily returns, does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the above results. Once
more, the CPS test reveals evidence of conta-
gion, while the linear model fails to reject the
null hypothesis of interdependence in all cases.
However, interestingly, when we include the
period of May – June 1998 to the crisis period
(i.e. extending the crisis period) the CPS test
rejects the null hypothesis for Hungary and
only in the case of S&P Euro. By contrast,
when we exclude October 1998 from the cri-
sis period and deﬁne the crisis period as July
15 – September 15, 1998, the test rejects in-
terdependence for the Czech Republic as well
as Latvia. Interestingly, robustness tests re-
Poland and Slovakia.Was the Russian Financial Crisis Contagious? 11
Table 3
Daily Stock Return Correlations.
Case 1 Case 2
ˆ ½C ˆ ½ p1 ˆ ½P p2 ˆ ½C ˆ ½ p1 ˆ ½P p2
Czech R. – Russia 0.58 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.00 0.00
Estonia – Russia 0.22 0.43 0.94 0.12 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.59 0.12 0.09
Hungary – Russia 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.22 0.00 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.22 0.00
Latvia – Russia 0.23 0.11 0.23 -0.09 0.01 0.19 0.08 0.22 -0.09 0.01
Poland – Russia 0.45 0.54 0.76 0.16 0.01 0.48 0.44 0.39 0.16 0.00
Slovakia – Russia 0.03 0.29 0.95 0.04 0.53 0.17 0.12 0.37 0.04 0.13
Slovenia – Russia 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.57 0.06 0.14
Ukraine – Russia 0.15 0.17 0.55 0.07 0.27 0.15 0.16 0.54 0.07 0.25
Note: Correlations have been computed on the basis of two day rolling averages.
Case 1. Tranquil: 01/12/98–07/14/98, T=112; Crisis: 07/15/98–10/15/98, T=63.
Case 2. Tranquil: 01/12/98–05/11/98, T=76; Crisis: 05/12/98–10/15/98, T=99.
In both cases post-crisis period is 10/16/98–12/20/99, T=246. T – sample size.
ˆ ½, ˆ ½C, ˆ ½P – correlation coeﬃcients during stable, crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.
p – p-values of the Fisher test for equality of correlations.
lated to crisis–post-crisis analysis (for com-
mon factors: S&P Euro and S&P 500) show
that we rejected the null of interdependence in
the case of ﬁve countries (Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland). At the
same time, it should be noted that in most
cases we failed to reject the null of interde-
pendence for the other remaining countries.23
5.2. Monte Carlo Evidence on the Size
and Power of the Tests
The mixed results call for a power and sam-
ple size analysis in order to shed light on which
test has the correct size and better explana-
tory power. I performed Monte Carlo simula-
tion experiments to assess the size and power
of the linear and the CPS tests for contagion.
In the case of the CPS test the data has been
generated by a process belonging to the null
hypothesis (7). For the linear model case, the
data is generated using the following data gen-
23Ukraine appeared once in robustness tests related
to post-crisis period analysis.
erating process24, which is equivalent to (1)
ri = ®i + °i ¢ rj + ºi
rj = ®j + °j ¢ ºj (11)
where ºi and ºj are independent and normally
distributed. For the purposes of construct-
ing size-power curves the data is generated by
processes belonging to respective alternative
hypotheses. The Fisher z-statistic is calcu-
lated for each replication, and corresponding
p-values are computed. Following Davidson
and MacKinnon (1998) the results of Monte
Carlo experiments are presented in a graphi-
cal form.
Figure 4 shows size distortions (nominal
size against actual size) for univariate (lin-
ear model) and bivariate (CPS test) corre-
lation analysis with diﬀerent variance ratios.
Since I am interested in small test sizes, both
ﬁgures are truncated at x = 0:10 and y =
0:10. These are based on an experiment with
100,000 replications. Sample sizes during sta-
ble and crisis periods are set as n = 112 and
24Using the following Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of (ri;rj)
P =
p







and taking into account (ri;rj)0 = P ¢ (ui;uj)0, DGP
of the rates of return can be written as (11) (Corsetti,
Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002), p.11).12 U. Olimov
Table 4
Linear Model: Test for signiﬁcant increases in cross-market correlations.
Crisis Crisis (adj.) Tranquil Post-crisis
Correlations ˆ ½C ˆ ½adj ˆ ½ z-stat ˆ ½P z-stat
Czech Republic – Russia 0.58 0.38 0.20 1.23 0.00 2.74*
Estonia – Russia 0.22 0.13 0.43 -2.11 0.12 0.02
Hungary – Russia 0.53 0.34 0.55 -1.67 0.22 0.94
Latvia – Russia 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.12 -0.09 1.58
Poland – Russia 0.45 0.28 0.54 -1.96 0.16 0.84
Slovakia – Russia 0.03 0.02 0.29 -1.73 0.04 -0.15
Slovenia – Russia 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.29 0.06 0.63
Ukraine – Russia 0.15 0.09 0.17 -0.53 0.07 0.16
Note: Equation (3) has been used for adjustment. Tranquil period: 01/12/98 – 07/14/98,
T=112; Crisis period: 07/15/98 – 10/15/98, T=63; Post-crisis period: 10/16/98 – 12/20/99,
T=246. H0: no signiﬁcant increase in correlation. z-stat – the Fisher z-statistic. *Signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
nC = 63, respectively.
The following parameters ¸j = 1:57 and
¸C
j = 1:68, which are the observed variance




k=1 rkt), have been used in the ex-
periments. This is a case where the variance
ratios are increasing during the crisis period
i.e. ¸j < ¸C
j . This pattern has been observed
when I used IRTS and ERTS as common fac-
tors (see Table 2). From Figure 4 it is clear
that the linear model performs poorly under
the null hypothesis and systematically under-
rejects in the case of small test sizes. This
pattern supports the Corsetti, Pericoli, and
Sbracia (2002) criticism, which claims that
the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) formula (3)
adjusts the sample correlation coeﬃcient by
the full increase in the variance of market re-
turns in the country of origin during a crisis
period. Seemingly, Figure 4 illustrates why
this kind of test hardly ﬁnds any evidence of
contagion. In contrast, the CPS test seems
to work very well under the null. Surpris-
ingly, p ¡ value plot almost corresponds with
a 45-degree line (dotted line), indicating no
size distortion (for ¸j = 1:57 and ¸C
j = 1:68).
Figure 5 shows size-power curves for the lin-
ear model and CPS tests with diﬀerent vari-
ance ratios. In this case, both ﬁgures are trun-
cated at x = 0:10 and y = 0:20. The Monte
Carlo experiments performed using the data
which are generated under the alternative hy-
potheses of both linear and the CPS tests.
Similar to the previous case, the size of sam-
ples during stable and crisis periods are set as
n = 112 and nC = 63, respectively. These re-
sults provide a piece of evidence that the CPS
has greater power than the linear model for a
given size of test. In sum, I ﬁnd that at least
for the examined parameter values, it appears
that the CPS test has less size distortion than
the linear model.
6. Conclusion
This study tested for stock market conta-
gion of the 1998 Russian ﬁnancial crisis us-
ing both univariate and bivariate correlation
analysis. The results of the paper extended
prior research by using a bivariate correlation
analysis based on a newly developed Corsetti-
Pericoli-Sbracia (CPS) test. I also presented
results of a leading univariate test of con-
tagion, which is derived from a linear rela-
tionship between stock market returns (also
known as a linear model). In line with the
literature, the paper deﬁnes contagion as a
structural break in cross-market linkages af-
ter a shock to one country.
In addition to the traditional tranquil–crisis
analysis, I proposed to conduct the crisis–
post-crisis comparison and to label post-crisis
contagion as a “reverse” contagion. Such a
comparison will likely shed light on the na-
ture of the relationships among the markets




S&P Euro S&P 500 IRTS ERTS FINC FEXL Model
Benchmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Daily returns 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
Tranq.: 01/12/98–05/06/98
Crisis: 05/07/98–10/15/98 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tranq.: 01/12/98–07/14/98
Crisis: 07/15/98–09/15/98 2 2 2 2 2 2 0
Crisis: 05/07/98–10/15/98
Post: 10/16/98–12/20/99 4 4 2 3 3 4 2
Crisis: 07/15/98–09/15/98
Post: 09/16/98–12/20/99 5 5 2 2 2 2 1
Note: Number of countries for which the null of interdependence is rejected. CPS – the
Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia test. IRTS & ERTS – average daily return in a cross section of stock
markets (including & excluding Russia, respectively). FINC & FEXL – common factors from
maximum-likelihood factor analysis.
tagion. There are several beneﬁts from do-
ing such analysis. One, comparison of just
stable and crisis periods does not allow for
detailed investigation of the existing relation-
ship among markets. Beyond this, there are
two problems with such an investigation; ﬁrst
crises are usually short and therefore provide
only a small sample, and second, it is diﬃcult
to determine the exact ending of a crisis. To
reveal such eﬀects we can compare crisis and
post-crisis period cross-market correlations.
Analysis of raw cross-market correlations
during tranquil, crisis and post-crisis periods
exhibits some features of the Russian ﬁnancial
crisis. First, the correlation coeﬃcient be-
tween stock market returns in Russia and
other eight European transition economies de-
creased during the Russian crisis period, mak-
ing a case of falling correlations. Second,
crisis–post-crisis comparison indicates mean-
ingful diﬀerences in correlation coeﬃcients be-
tween the Russian and the Czech, Hungar-
ian, Latvian and Polish stock markets. The
linear model results provide evidence consis-
tent with previous studies, since it fails to re-
ject the null hypothesis of interdependence for
all countries. For example, Gelos and Sahay
(2001) considered the following three pairs of
countries the Czech–Russia, Hungary–Russia
and Poland–Russia in their analysis and found
no evidence of contagion.
In contrast, the CPS test results provide
strong evidence of contagion from Russia to
the Czech Republic in the case of all common
factors. At the same time, post-crisis analysis
revealed that there were structural breaks in
the relation of the Russian with the Czech and
Latvian stock returns in the case of all com-
mon factors, and with the Hungarian and Pol-
ish in the case of S&P 500. Interestingly, the
results are associated with falling correlations
during the crisis period. In addition to our
deﬁnition of contagion (stronger-than-normal
ties), if we also deﬁne contagion as weaker-
than-normal ties, there are a number of cases
in our example which could be considered as a
contagion: Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia. The results of the bivariate correlation
analysis also suggest that “regional” common
factors are more relevant than other factors
i.e. S&P Euro and S&P 500. In other words,
in the case of S&P Euro and S&P 500 a larger
fraction of the overall change in volatility in
Russia can be attributed to country-speciﬁc
noise. At the same time, when I used S&P
Euro and S&P 500 as common factors the
number of countries which are the null of in-
terdependence is rejected increased up to four
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and
Poland). I think importance of S&P 500 in the14 U. Olimov
post-crisis analysis could be related to liquid-
ity and incentive problems Dornbusch, Park,
and Claessens (2000). Accordingly, most in-
vestors may found it optimal to sell many
higher-risk assets in other transition countries
when the Russian crisis occurred.
The mixed results call for a power and sam-
ple size analysis in order to shed light on which
test has the correct size and better explana-
tory power. I performed Monte Carlo simula-
tion experiments to assess the size and power
of the linear and the CPS tests for contagion.
Summarizing the results we can conclude that
at least for the examined parameter values, it
appears that the CPS test has less size distor-
tion than the linear model.
Based on our results we can condition-
ally divide the considered countries into two
groups: “aﬀected” – the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Latvia and Poland; and “immune” –
Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. “Af-
fected” group countries have more advanced
economies and partly completed the transi-
tion. At the same time, “immune” group
countries, which are not aﬀected by the Rus-
sian crisis, are still lagging behind in terms
of the development of ﬁnancial markets (Gros
and Suhrcke 2000). This result is also in har-
mony with hypothesis that countries which
are not ﬁnancially integrated due to capital
controls or lack of access to international ﬁ-
nancing are by deﬁnition immune to contagion
(Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens 2000). If it
is a case, what is a cost of further ﬁnancial
market integration in transition economies?
As a result, could we expect more exten-
sive contagious eﬀects in the future? It indi-
cates that strengthening macroeconomic poli-
cies and ﬁnancial systems as well as improving
crisis prevention policies should be one of the
main policy aims in transition economies.
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(a) Case 1. Crisis: 07/15/98–10/15/98.















































(b) Case 2. Crisis: 05/12/98–10/15/98.
Figure 3. Scatter Diagram: Daily Stock Re-
turn Correlations.
Note: If correlations are equal then circles (triangles)
should fall on the 45-degree line. In both cases the
post-crisis period is 10/16/98–12/20/99.16 U. Olimov































(a) A Linear Model: ¸ = 1:57, n = 112, nC =
63.































(b) The CPS Test: ¸ = 1:57, n = 112, n
C = 63.
Figure 4. Size distortions for the linear model
and the CPS tests.






















(a) A Linear Model: ¸ = 1:57, n = 112, nC =
63.






















(b) The CPS Test: ¸ = 1:57, n = 112, n
C = 63.
Figure 5. Size-power curves for the linear
model and the CPS tests.Was the Russian Financial Crisis Contagious? 17
Table 6
The CPS Test Results.
S&P Euro S&P 500
Crisis Tranquil Post-crisis Tranquil Post-crisis
ˆ ½C ˆ Á0 z0 ˆ Á1 z1 ˆ Á0 z0 ˆ Á1 z1
Czech R.– Russia 0.58 0.35 1.85** 0.01 4.56* 0.31 2.11** 0.00 4.57*
Estonia – Russia 0.22 0.39 -1.24 0.25 -0.26 0.38 -1.13 0.15 0.46
Hungary – Russia 0.53 0.40 1.06 0.38 1.34** 0.39 1.15 0.22 2.56*
Latvia – Russia 0.23 0.28 -0.36 -0.20 2.99* 0.23 -0.04 -0.12 2.44*
Poland – Russia 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.31 1.11 0.39 0.46 0.19 2.05**
Slovakia – Russia 0.03 0.38 -2.30 0.08 -0.37 0.35 -2.13 0.05 -0.16
Slovenia – Russia 0.25 0.26 -0.08 0.13 0.90 0.21 0.24 0.08 1.24
Ukraine – Russia 0.15 0.34 -1.21 0.14 0.09 0.30 -0.93 0.09 0.47
IRTS ERTS
Crisis Tranquil Post-crisis Tranquil Post-crisis
ˆ ½C ˆ Á0 z0 ˆ Á1 z1 ˆ Á0 z0 ˆ Á1 z1
Czech R.– Russia 0.58 0.30 2.20* 0.01 4.55* 0.30 2.19* 0.01 4.55*
Estonia – Russia 0.22 0.57 -2.63 0.32 -0.79 0.52 -2.25 0.29 -0.57
Hungary – Russia 0.53 0.65 -1.17 0.49 0.38 0.58 -0.46 0.42 1.05
Latvia – Russia 0.23 0.18 0.31 -0.25 3.40* 0.18 0.28 -0.23 3.27*
Poland – Russia 0.45 0.64 -1.74 0.40 0.39 0.58 -1.08 0.36 0.78
Slovakia – Russia 0.03 0.41 -2.57 0.10 -0.53 0.40 -2.49 0.10 -0.50
Slovenia – Russia 0.25 0.16 0.60 0.16 0.65 0.16 0.56 0.15 0.71
Ukraine – Russia 0.15 0.27 -0.73 0.18 -0.19 0.27 -0.75 0.17 -0.12
FINC FEXL
Crisis Tranquil Post-crisis Tranquil Post-crisis
ˆ ½C ˆ Á0 z0 ˆ Á1 z1 ˆ Á0 z0 ˆ Á1 z1
Czech R. – Russia 0.58 0.35 1.83** 0.01 4.04* 0.37 1.71** 0.01 4.55*
Estonia – Russia 0.22 0.61 -3.10 0.31 -0.73 0.61 -3.03 0.29 -0.57
Hungary – Russia 0.53 0.69 -1.53 0.46 0.66 0.67 -1.30 0.43 0.98
Latvia – Russia 0.23 0.22 0.07 -0.25 3.37* 0.23 -0.02 -0.23 3.25*
Poland – Russia 0.45 0.68 -2.12 0.39 0.53 0.66 -1.91 0.36 0.76
Slovakia – Russia 0.03 0.47 -3.03 0.10 -0.53 0.48 -3.12 0.10 -0.49
Slovenia – Russia 0.25 0.19 0.38 0.16 0.66 0.20 0.30 0.15 0.73
Ukraine – Russia 0.15 0.31 -1.07 0.18 -0.19 0.33 -1.18 0.17 -0.11
Note: Tranquil period: 01/12/98 – 07/14/98, T=112. Crisis period: 07/15/98 – 10/15/98, T=63. Post-crisis
period: 10/16/98 – 12/20/99, T=246. Common factors: S&P Euro, S&P 500 – Standard &Poors Indices; IRTS &
ERTS – average daily return in a cross section of stock markets (including & excluding Russia, respectively);
FINC & FEXL – common factors from maximum-likelihood factor analysis. ˆ ½C – correlation coeﬃcients during
the crisis period. ˆ Á – the estimated theoretical measure of interdependence, where ˆ Á0 for tranquil–crisis analysis
and ˆ Á1 for crisis–post-crisis analysis. z – the Fisher z-statistic for equality of correlations, where z0 – ˆ Á0 vs. ½C
and z1 – ˆ Á1 vs. ½C. Signiﬁcant at the *1% (**5%) level.